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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper employs the three concepts of ‘gold’ (financial rewards), ‘ribbon’ 
(reputational/career rewards) and ‘puzzle’ (intrinsic satisfaction) to examine the extrinsic 
and intrinsic aspects of scientists’ motivation for pursuing commercial activities. The 
study is based on 36 individual interviews and an on-line questionnaire survey of 735 
scientists from five major UK research universities. It finds that there is a diversity of 
motivations for commercial engagement, and that many do so for reputational and 
intrinsic reasons and that financial rewards play a relatively small part. The paper draws 
on self-determination theory in social psychology to analyse the relationship between 
scientists’ value orientations with regard to commercial engagement and their personal 
motivations.  It finds that those with traditional beliefs about the separation of science 
from commerce are more likely to be extrinsically motivated, using commercialization as 
a means to obtain resources to support their quest for the ‘ribbon’.  In contrast, those 
identify closely with entrepreneurial norms are intrinsically motivated by the autonomy 
and ‘puzzle-solving’ involved in applied commercial research while also motivated by 
the ‘gold’. The study highlights the primacy of scientists’ self motivation, and suggests 
that a fuller explanation of their commercial behaviour will need to consider a broader 
mix of motives to include the social and affective aspects of intrinsic motivation. In 
conclusion, the paper argues that policy to encourage commercial engagement should 
build on reputational and intrinsic rather than purely financial motivations. 
 
Keywords: 
Academic scientists; entrepreneurial university; motivation; scientific norms and values; 
self-determination theory; research commercialization; knowledge transfer 
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What motivates academic scientists to engage in research 
commercialization: ‘gold’, ‘ribbon’ or ‘puzzle’? 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Growing intensity of university-industry ties and academic research commercialization 
have generated an intense debate about changing work norms among university scientists 
(Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001a; Vallas and Lee Kleinman, 2008). Central to this is a 
growing concern about academics being captured by the ethos of commercialism as they 
engage in for-profit science. Critics of the entrepreneurial paradigm see academics as 
‘promoters as well as victims’ of commercialization (Jacob, 2003)  who internalise the 
‘intrinsic value of money’ under the academic capitalist knowledge regime (Slaughter, 
2001; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). Proponents of the entrepreneurial university (Clark, 
1998; Etzkowitz, 1998) also underline the for-profit motive in their analysis of the ‘new 
school’ entrepreneurial scientist. While there is ample evidence of increased academic 
engagement in commercial activities such as patenting and spin-off company formation 
(D'Este and Patel, 2007; Siegel et al., 2007), what remains unexplored is whether this 
reflects the growth of a uniform category of entrepreneurial scientists driven by a 
common motive. This paper examines the diversity of scientists’ personal motivations for 
pursuing commercial activities and how this is influenced by their values and beliefs 
about the science-business relationship. It applies a social-psychological perspective 
which has hitherto been missing in the literature. The study challenges a common 
assumption that financial motives are the key drivers of scientists’ commercial activities. 
It highlights the importance of considering the complex mix of individual-level motives, 
including the social and intrinsic aspects, in explaining scientists’ commercial behaviour. 
 
In the traditional ‘Mertonian’ world of scientific research (Merton, 1957; 1973), the goal 
of scientists is to establish priority of discovery by being first to communicate an advance 
in knowledge and the rewards are the recognition awarded by the scientific community. 
Peer recognition in the form of publications, citations and prizes, namely, the ‘ribbon’, 
constitutes the basic form of extrinsic (or social) reward in science from which other 
extrinsic rewards may be derived, such as career advancement, increase in salaries and 
enlarged access to research resources.  Besides these extrinsic rewards, scientists are also 
motivated by the intrinsic satisfaction of doing research by solving the ‘puzzle’, creative 
activity being its own reward (Hagstrom, 1965). Some economists, however, have 
assumed that scientists, like most economic agents, are interested in money, the ‘gold’, as 
well (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Stephan, 1996).  More recently, many authors argue that 
the growth of entrepreneurial science has brought the reward structures of science and 
business closer together, resulting in a growing number of academics seeking to ‘cash in’ 
on their eminence, using the ‘ribbon’ to trade for the ‘gold’ (Stephan and Everhart, 1998; 
Audretsch and Stephan, 1999; Bains, 2005). There are growing concerns that the ‘gold’ 
may become a more central component of the motivational calculus of academic 
scientists, and dwarf the ‘ribbon’.  Arguably this can undermine the reputational-based 
reward system and compromise one of the central institutional elements of academic 
science (Bok, 2003). 
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Empirical research on the impact of financial incentives on scientists’ propensity to 
engage in commercialization has provided mixed evidence about the role of money as a 
motivational driver. While some studies find a positive link between financial incentives  
and the motivations of inventors to patent (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001b; Thursby et 
al., 2001; Lach and Schankerman, 2008), others conclude that monetary rewards offered 
by universities play no role (Colyvas et al., 2002; Markman et al., 2004).  Much of this 
work, however, has adopted a narrow conception of human motivation based on an 
economic model and is concerned primarily with the effects of financial incentives on 
behaviour of academic institutions rather than individual scientists. More recently, some 
authors (Baldini et al., 2007; Fini et al., 2009; Göktepe-Hulten and Mahagaonkar, 2010) 
have sought to explore the personal motives behind scientists’ transition to academic 
entrepreneurialism.  They found that academics’ involvement in commercial activities 
was not driven by the money incentive so much as the desire to generate research 
resources and gain reputation.  Although these studies have shed light on the importance 
of non-pecuniary factors, notably the social and reputational rewards associated with the 
‘ribbon’, none has given adequate attention to the intrinsic, ‘puzzle-solving’ aspect of 
motivation underlying the behaviours of scientists. Few authors have referred to the work 
of social psychologists which recognises the multifaceted nature of motivation and the 
pervasiveness of intrinsic motivation as a powerful driver of  action (Deci, 1975; 
Lindenberg, 2001). Moreover, the question of how scientists’ motives for commercial 
engagement vary according to their values and beliefs remains little understood.  
 
The present study adopts a broader and psychologically richer notion of motivation to 
incorporate its extrinsic as well as intrinsic aspects. It employs the three concepts of 
‘gold’ (financial rewards), ‘ribbon’ (reputation and career rewards) and ‘puzzle’ (intrinsic 
satisfaction)  (Stephan and Levin, 1992) to examine the complex mix of motives driving 
the behaviour of scientists. The analytical framework builds on theories of motivation in 
social psychology, notably the self-determination theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 2000; 
Ryan and Deci, 2000; Gagne and Deci, 2005) which posits that individuals’ motives for 
behaviour and their responses to different kinds of rewards are influenced by the degree 
of congruence between their personal values and those underlying the activity.  Thus, 
individuals can be extrinsically or intrinsically motivated to different degrees in their 
pursuit of an activity depending on how far they have internalised the values and 
regulatory structures associated with it.  Self-determination, according to social 
psychologists, is a critical factor distinguishing intrinsically motivated from externally 
regulated behaviour.  This directs attention to individual agency in the motivational 
process as actors strive to obtain valued outcomes through intentional behaviours. It also 
suggests the need to examine closely the perceptions of the individuals and their beliefs 
about the potential benefits and values of the activities concerned in interpreting the 
motivations underlying their behaviours. The analysis also draws on the insights of 
sociology of science literature on the ambivalence of scientists and their divergent value 
orientations (Merton and Barber, 1963; Box and Cotgrove, 1966; Cotgrove, 1970). The 
notion of ambivalence underscores the fact that individuals may hold contradictory 
attitudes towards the same activity and behave in ways that appear to be incompatible 
with their espoused beliefs or values. 
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The empirical study presented in this paper comprises 36 in-depth individual interviews 
and a survey sample of 735 academic scientists from five leading UK research 
universities. It focuses on two main questions. First, what is the relative importance of the  
‘gold’, ‘ribbon’ and ‘puzzle’ as motivators of scientists’ commercial pursuits? And 
second, how does the relative importance of these motivators vary across scientists 
according to their attitudes and beliefs about the science-business relationship? 
It adopts a mixed-method approach, combining qualitative and quantitative methods 
relating to the same sample as two-thirds of the interviewees also responded to the 
survey. This enables cross-validation of the findings and deepens insights from the study.  
 
To anticipate the main results, the study finds that the great majority of the scientists are 
motivated by the traditional rewards of the ‘ribbon’, using commercial activities as a 
means to generate resources for their research and professional goals. Personal pecuniary 
gain, the ‘gold’, although not irrelevant, is seen as important by a much smaller 
proportion of the scientists.  More crucially, the intrinsic satisfaction derived from 
commercial engagement itself, as in puzzle-solving, emerges as a central motivation 
shared by many of the scientists. Beyond this broad picture, the analysis finds significant 
variation in the motivations across scientists according to their value orientations. The 
‘traditional’ scientists who adhere strongly to the Mertonian norms are primarily 
extrinsically motivated, using commercialization as a means to support their quest for the 
ribbon.  In contrast, the ‘entrepreneurial’ scientists who identify most closely with the 
commercial ethos are intrinsically motivated in their commercial endeavours while also 
motivated to obtain personal financial gain, the ‘gold’. To these scientists, commercial 
engagement is a volitional, self-determined activity from which they derive personal 
enjoyment as a form of creative puzzle-solving, and the gold is seen as an integral part of 
their entrepreneurial achievement. In between these two polar positions, nearly half of the 
scientists engaged in commercial activities can be described as ‘hybrids’ who maintain a 
firm commitment to the core scientific values but also recognise the benefits of 
commercial engagement for their scientific goals. Besides the extrinsic rewards of the 
ribbon, these scientists are also strongly intrinsically motivated in their commercial 
endeavours which appear to satisfy their intellectual curiosity personally as well as the 
desire for doing good socially.  
 
This study focuses on the social-psychological dynamics of scientists’ motivations for 
commercial engagement and shows how motives for behaviour vary according to their 
personal values and beliefs.  It contributes not only to research on scientific motivation 
and academic entrepreneurialism but also has important implications for policy makers 
seeking to promote commercial exploitation of research.  In particular, it demonstrates 
that there is no one single ideal type of ‘entrepreneurial’ scientists marked by the desire 
for one particular kind of reward on its own. It is therefore unlikely that an 
undifferentiated approach focusing on extrinsic financial rewards will be effective in 
eliciting the requisite effort across the board. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the changes 
in the institutional context associated with the entrepreneurial university.  The third 
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section develops a theoretical framework on the relationship between scientists’ value 
orientations, the different types of motivations on the self-determination continuum and 
the salience of gold, ribbon or puzzle as desired outcomes of commercial engagement. 
This is followed by a section which introduces the research methods and the key 
variables used in the empirical analysis.  Section five examines the relationship between 
the motivating factors and scientists’ propensity to engage in commercial activities.  A 
further section explores the diverse value orientations of those engaged in commercial 
activities and the salience of the different motivating factors. The paper ends by 
discussing the theoretical and policy implications.  
 
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
The notion of the ‘entrepreneurial university’ that stresses knowledge capitalization has 
become a powerful force that has shaped the governance of universities and work 
experiences of academic scientists in recent years.  In the U.K., the government’s science 
and technology policy over the past two decades has sought to exploit the scientific 
knowledge base for innovation and economic competitiveness by promoting stronger 
collaboration between university and industry, and stimulating academic 
entrepreneurship (DTI, 2000; Lambert, 2003). At the same time, universities themselves 
have become willing actors in a range of markets in response to growing constraints on 
public funding and to adapt to a more competitive environment (Slaughter and Leslie, 
1997; Henkel, 2007). Many are experimenting with new modes of governance and 
institutional practices to engage in commercial exploitation of research.   
 
The institutional transformation associated with the entrepreneurial university has 
broadened the acceptable roles of academic researchers to accommodate engagement in 
commercial activities. In parallel with the traditional ‘Mertonian’ model that emphasises 
disinterested research, an alternative model of academic entrepreneurialism that 
encourages commercial exploitation of research has gained prominence in recent years.  
Some authors argue that the rules that govern achievement and competition in the world 
of academic science have changed in recent years to incorporate commercial outcomes 
(Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Owen-Smith, 2003). A potential consequence of this is to 
bring the reward structures of two previously separate institutional spheres of science and 
commerce closer together, opening up the possibility for scientists to translate scientific 
credits across the two arenas. In the face of these developments and a normative duality 
that now governs university research, scientists may find themselves torn between the 
traditional Mertonian ideals of basic science and the reality of an encroaching market-
oriented logic. While some may seek to resolve the tension by making choices between 
the dichotomous alternatives, others may attempt to reconcile the polar positions by re-
negotiating their roles at the intersection of the two domains (Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2001a; Murray, 2006).  Scientists’ engagement in commercial activities will therefore 
need to be interpreted within this shifting institutional context in which individual action 
often reflects the contradiction experienced rather than necessarily signalling unequivocal 
acceptance of a particular set of norms or values.  
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Early research in the sociology of science drew attention to the ‘sociological 
ambivalence’ of scientists and the frequent deviation of their actual behaviour from the 
default Mertonian ideals (Mitroff, 1974; Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Gieryn (1983) 
coined the term ‘boundary work’ to denote the active agency role of scientists in drawing 
and redrawing the boundaries of their work in pursuit of professional autonomy and 
increased resources.  His analysis showed that the boundary between basic and applied 
research was clearly established when the scientific community wanted to protect its 
professional autonomy. However, it often became obscure, if not dissolved, when 
scientists sought to secure and justify increased resources and public support for scientific 
research.  Thus scientific work can be at once pure and applied; and the boundary 
between the production of knowledge and its exploitation can be clearly demarcated or 
blurred. This ambiguity is a source of internal tension, as well as giving scientists much 
opportunity for choice and variation. The contemporary transformation in the relationship 
between science and business has brought the sociological ambivalence of science to the 
forefront and opened up new opportunities for individual action at the increasingly 
blurred boundary between the two sectors.   
 
Recognising this marked ambivalence in scientific work is essential for understanding the 
complex relationship between values and behaviours because it implies that scientists’ 
adherence to traditional ‘Mertonian’ norms does not preclude involvement in commercial 
activities and commercial engagement does not necessarily signal their acceptance of its 
underlying ethos. The same outward behaviour of commercial engagement may be 
underpinned by diverse attitudes and motives. Shinn and Lammy (2006), for example,  
identify three categories of academic researchers who pursue divergent paths of 
commercialization: the ‘academics’ are those who weakly identify with the firm but may 
create a business venture for instrumental reasons; the ‘pioneers’ are driven by economic 
as well as scientific considerations; and the ‘janus’ are the hybrid type driven primarily 
by their passion for scientific knowledge production.  Scientists who participate in 
commercial activities do not constitute a homogeneous category and hence the need to 
adopt a differentiated approach for understanding their motivations.  
 
3. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 The Social Psychology of Human Motivation: Self-Determination Theory (SDT) 
 
The work of social psychologists on motivation, notably self-determination theory (SDT) 
(Deci and Ryan, 2000; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Gagne and Deci, 2005), provides a useful 
lens for examining the multifaceted nature of human motivation and its relationship with 
social values and norms. It treats motivation as the outcome of interaction between 
external regulatory processes and individuals’ internal psychological needs for autonomy 
and self-determination. Taking the view that people are moved to act when they believe 
that the behaviours will lead to desired outcomes, SDT differentiates the content of 
outcomes and the regulatory processes through which they are pursued and thus 
predicting variation in the motivation underlying behaviours. Moreover, its emphasis on 
self-regulation in the motivational process is particularly germane to the case of 
academics who enjoy considerable freedom in their work.  
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SDT distinguishes three main states: intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation and 
amotivation. Intrinsic motivation refers to doing something for its inherent pleasure and 
satisfaction, whereas extrinsic motivation refers to doing something for a separable 
outcome or external rewards. Amotivation means having no intention to act because of 
lack of interest or not valuing the activity (Ryan, 1995).  SDT posits that an individual’s 
motivation for behaviour can be placed on a continuum of self-determination (see Figure 
1). It ranges from amotivation, which is wholly lacking in self-determination to intrinsic 
motivation which is an archetypal self-determined behaviour because it arises from the 
individual’s spontaneous interest rather than driven by external control. Between the two 
poles, extrinsic motivation can vary in its degree of self-determination, ranging from 
behaviour that is fully externally regulated to one that is partially or fully internally 
integrated which approximates intrinsic motivation. Central to SDT is the argument that 
extrinsically motivated behaviour can be transformed into intrinsically motivated one as 
individuals internalise the values and behavioural regulation that underlies it. When this 
occurs, the behaviour becomes autonomous and no longer requires the presence of an 
external reward.  
 
Building on the basic tenet that human beings have innate psychological needs for 
autonomy, SDT sees  internalization as ‘an active, natural process in which individuals 
attempt to transform socially sanctioned mores or requests into personally endorsed 
values and self-regulations’ (Deci and Ryan, 2000: 235). As such, SDT stresses 
individual agency in the internalization process in that it is not just something that the 
socializing environment does to individuals but also represents the means through which 
individuals actively assimilate and reconstitute external regulations into inner values so 
that the individuals can be self-determined while enacting them (Ryan, 1993). SDT 
identifies three distinct processes of internalization: introjection, identification and 
integration, which represent different degrees or forms of regulation associated with the 
different motivational types (mix) on the continuum of extrinsic-intrinsic motivation 
(Deci and Ryan, 2000). Introjection occurs when individuals partially take in an external 
regulation but do not accept it as their own and therefore the behaviour is not congruent 
with their values and is not self-determined:  it is a partially ‘controlled’ activity and is 
predominately extrinsically motivated. Identification occurs when individuals identify 
with the value of behaviour for their own self-selected goals and they experience greater 
freedom and volition because the behaviour is more congruent with their personal goals 
and identities. Identification makes the behaviour more autonomous and moves it towards 
the intrinsic end of the continuum. The most complete form of internalization is 
integration which occurs when individuals completely identify with the importance of 
social regulations or values, assimilate them into their sense of self and accept them as 
their own.  As the behaviour becomes fully congruent with the individuals’ values and 
identity, they can be intrinsically motivated by it in the absence of an external regulation. 
 
By focusing on the variation in the level of internalization and its relationship with the 
extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of motivation, SDT suggests that there are different kinds 
and degrees of motivation between the two polar types. There are three broad categories 
of outcomes associated with the different types of motivation: material, social and 
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affective. While material outcomes are primarily related to extrinsic motivation, affective 
outcomes are closely related to intrinsic motivation. Social outcomes, however, are 
related to the ‘in-between’ types of motivation such as introjection (to fit in or feel 
worthy) and identification (to act appropriately). In contrast to the canonical economic 
model of human motivation and behaviour which stresses the efficacy of extrinsic 
financial rewards, social psychologists argue that social and affective outcomes are 
equally salient. In fact, by postulating that human beings have a general organismic 
tendency towards self-regulation (Ryan, 1995), social psychologists stress the potency of 
intrinsic motivation in driving behaviours. Although the concept of intrinsic motivation is 
often linked to affective outcomes, it has recently been broadened to incorporate a social, 
normative dimension (Grant, 2008). Lindenberg (2001), for example, makes a distinction 
between enjoyment-based and obligation-based intrinsic motivation. The former is tied to 
the emotion for the improvement of one’s condition whereas the latter refers to the 
satisfaction derived from acting according to a rule, norm or principle. In both cases, the 
motivation driving the behaviour can be said to be intrinsic because it arises in the 
absence of material rewards or external constraints.  
 
It should be noted that behaviours often lead to a combination of different outcomes. An 
intrinsic interest in the activity does not necessarily rule out the salience of extrinsic 
rewards insofar as the perceived locus of causality of the activity lies within the 
individual (Deci, 1975). Although some authors argue that money rewards can undermine 
intrinsic motivation due to psychological substitution effects (e.g. Frey, 1997), others 
suggest that some highly autonomous individuals (e.g. creative artists or scientists) may 
be strongly intrinsically interested in the activity and, at the same time, be strongly 
motivated to acquire extrinsic rewards (e.g. recognition, careers and money) for that 
activity (Amabile et al., 1994). Deci et al (1999: 658) point out that ‘the effects of 
external rewards on behaviours necessitate a differentiated analysis of how the rewards 
are interpreted by the recipients’.  All these highlight the need to consider scientists’ 
perceptions and beliefs about the potential benefits of commercial engagement in 
interpreting their motives for the behaviour.  
 
3.2 Scientific Motivation and Commercial Engagement: Ribbon, Gold and Puzzle  
Scientists may be motivated by a complex array of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors 
in their commercial pursuits. A characteristic feature of the scientific reward system is its 
multidimensional nature, comprising the three components of the ‘ribbon’, ‘gold’ and 
‘puzzle’ (Stephen and Levin, 1992).  In the Mertonian world of academic science, the 
ribbon is the most substantial part of scientists’ rewards. This is not only because 
scientists are strongly motivated by the recognition and prestige bestowed by their 
professional peers but also, other rewards such as salary and research funds are usually 
graduated in accordance with the degree of recognition achieved (Mulkay and Turner, 
1971; Stephan, 1996).  The ribbon is a deeply institutionalized feature in the scientific 
reward system and scientists feel the effects of the drive (Hagstrom, 1974; Hong and 
Walsh, 2009). Within the traditional model, publication is the main currency in the 
exchange relationship for the ribbon. The growing influence of the entrepreneurial 
paradigm may be subtly changing the ribbon exchange relationship to incorporate certain 
forms of commercial science. Several authors point out that contemporary academics can 
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use patents as an alternative currency for building cycles of credit for obtaining resources 
to further the traditional rewards (Murray, 2006; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003). Others 
suggest that the increasing reputational returns associated with patenting may prompt 
some scientists to use commercial activities as a means to further their academic careers 
(Krabel and Mueller, 2009).   
 
Although personal pecuniary gain, the ‘gold’, is also a component of the scientific reward 
system, it is predominately a consequence of the ribbon, and not a direct incentive for 
research in academic science  (Stephan, 1996).  The rise of entrepreneurial science may 
well have opened up opportunities for scientists to reap financial rewards from 
commercial activities. It is, however, not entirely clear whether, and to what extent, the 
‘gold’ is a motivational driver in the first place.  There is a longstanding controversy in 
motivation theory about the role of money as a motivator (Sachau, 2007).  Herzberg’s 
(1966) ‘motivation–hygiene theory’ and more recently authors in the field of positive 
psychology (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) argue that money is a hygiene factor, 
not a motivator. It contributes to individual satisfaction or dissatisfaction but may not 
have the power to motivate on its own.  
 
Beyond the extrinsic rewards of the ribbon and the gold, the majority of academic 
scientists are intrinsically motivated to advance knowledge, and they also derive immense 
satisfaction from engaging in challenging and creative activities. Indeed, the desire to 
engage in creative puzzle solving is the hall mark of a dedicated scientist (Eiduson, 1962; 
Cotgrove, 1970). In the Mertonian world of basic science, scientists derive satisfaction 
and enjoyment from seeking and finding vital truths within a relatively bounded scientific 
community.  According to this view, there is no reason why the pursuit of creativity and 
puzzle solving should not take place in the context of an orientation towards knowledge 
application and entrepreneurial engagement.  
 
The different motivational drivers can co-exist and scientists may be extrinsically or 
intrinsically motivated to different degrees in their pursuit of commercialization. The 
university is a professional bureaucracy where academics are accorded a relatively high 
degree of autonomy and they can choose whether to engage with industry. Few would be 
doing it as a result of external compulsion but the individuals’ sense of pressure or 
willingness to participate in commercial activities may vary according to their beliefs 
about the values and potential benefits of such activities. Existing research has shown that 
scientists differ in their degree of attachment to the traditional ‘Mertonian’ values (Box 
and Cotgrove, 1966; Hermanowicz, 1998) and hold varied beliefs about the appropriate 
relationship between science and commerce (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001a; Renault, 
2006). Thus, their motives for pursuing commercial science will vary. 
 
Figure 1 summarises the main points of the theoretical framework. It postulates that 
commercial engagement can be either a ‘controlled’ or ‘autonomous’ activity depending 
how far scientists have ‘internalised’ the values associated with it. Scientists who adhere 
strongly to the traditional Mertonian norms of basic science will perceive 
commercialization to be at odds with their personal values and goals, and the majority are 
likely to be amotivated.  However, some may take part in the activity as a result of 
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introjection. These ‘traditional-oriented’ scientists can be placed at the extrinsic end of 
the motivational continuum and may use commercialization as a means to obtain 
resources (e.g. research funding) to support their pursuit for the ribbon.  In contrast, other 
scientists may pursue the activity volitionally out of a sense of personal commitment or 
interest because they have fully integrated the norm of entrepreneurialism. They could be 
motivated to do what is actually in their own interest and the desired outcomes could be 
both affective and material. The financial returns in this case could represent both 
achievement and profit. This type of ‘entrepreneurial-oriented’ scientists can be placed at 
the intrinsic end of the continuum. Between the polar opposites, there are reasons to 
expect some scientists to hold an ambivalent attitude towards commercial activities and 
adopt a ‘hybrid’ position encompassing characteristics of the ‘traditional’ and 
‘entrepreneurial’.  Owen-Smith and Powell (2001a: 4) argue that individual academics’ 
choices in response to the entrepreneurial academic paradigm ‘have created a myriad of 
positions that are neither old nor new school, but instead combine characteristics of both’.  
In a study of scientists’ role transition to academic entrepreneurs, Jain et al (2009: 927) 
observe that this process typically involves crafting a hybrid role identity in which 
scientists ‘overlay elements of a commercial orientation onto an academic one’. This is 
similar to the process of identification described in SDT through which people identify 
with the value and importance of behaviour for their self-selected values (Ryan and Deci, 
2000). These scientists can be placed mid-point on the motivational continuum - they 
may be extrinsically motivated somewhat while at the same time intrinsically motivated 
in their commercial pursuits.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA 
4.1. Data Collection and Sample 
The study used a combination of in-depth individual interviews and an on-line 
questionnaire survey. The sample consisted of scientists from five major U.K. research 
universities working in the fields of biological sciences, medicine, computer science and 
engineering, and physical sciences (including chemistry, physics and mathematics). 
Previous studies suggest that research commercialization tends to be concentrated among 
eminent scientists in top-ranked departments or universities (Zucker et al., 1998; Di 
Gregorio and Shane, 2003). This study sampled scientists from the universities where 
opportunities for commercialization of fundamental research are plentiful. It includes 
three universities which are among the top five UK universities in terms of their research 
budgets and size of science faculties, and two smaller universities with centres of 
research excellence in the relevant disciplines.  All the five universities have well-
established organisational units supporting knowledge transfer to industry and incentive 
schemes to encourage academics to engage in commercial activities. Thus, the sample is 
oriented towards the elite academic researchers operating in an environment in which 
they have the options to make a meaningful choice between traditional Mertonian goals 
and those of commercial engagement.  
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The first phase of data collection involved in-depth individual interviews with scientists 
engaged in various types of industrial links ranging from traditional modes of 
collaboration (e.g. collaborative research, contract research, personal consultancy, joint 
publications and student sponsorships) to direct involvement in commercial activities 
(e.g. patenting, licensing, spin-off company affiliation or formation). Although the main 
focus of the study is on the latter category, the former provides a reference group for the 
analysis. The individuals were identified mainly through CV searches on the universities’ 
websites. A snowball method was also used to obtain additional names. A total of 36 
academic scientists were interviewed. These were all senior academics in tenured 
positions, mostly professors.  It should be noted that this is a selective sample as the 
majority took part in the study had substantive industrial links and commercialization 
experience: 10 were engaged solely in collaborative links, and 26 were engaged in a 
range of collaborative and commercial activities including 16 spin-off company founders 
and 3 affiliates. The sample is therefore skewed towards those with an ‘entrepreneurial’ 
orientation and serves as a critical group for testing the ‘academic capitalism’ argument.  
 
The objectives of the interviews were twofold. First, they sought to obtain rich qualitative 
data to help interpret the meanings that actors attribute to actions and relationships which 
cannot be easily captured by a questionnaire survey. And second, they served as a pilot 
for exploring and testing the relevant questions for the survey. The interviews used a 
semi-structured questionnaire focussing on the scientists’ industrial links experience, 
their attitudes and orientations towards science-business relations and research 
commercialization. Those who were actively engaged in industrial links were asked 
detailed questions about their interface with industry, the reasons and motivations for the 
involvement and assessment of the rewards and benefits of these activities. Most of the 
interviews took place in 2006. Each interview lasted for about 75 to 90 minutes, with 
some lasting for more than two hours. All of the interviews were recorded and 
transcribed.   
 
Following the interviews and initial data analysis, an on-line questionnaire survey was 
implemented in early 2007.  The web-based questionnaire was e-mailed to about 3,100 
academics, following a successful pilot. The sample population included all academic 
staff of the disciplines mentioned above and principal investigators of the related major 
research units listed on the universities’ websites, excluding post-doctoral researchers and 
research assistants.1  The software used for the survey enabled tracking of the responses 
and reminder messages were sent twice to those who did not respond initially. This 
subsequently yielded 734 responses, giving a 24 percent response rate. This is relatively 
good for internet-based surveys. There was no significant variation in the response rates 
across disciplines, indicating a degree of consistency in the response patterns. Similar to 
the interviews, the responses were likely to be skewed towards those more actively 
engaged in industrial links as these academics might have felt more motivated to respond 
to the survey. 
 
The distribution of the interview and survey samples by discipline is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 about here 
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4.2. Analytical Approach and Main Variables 
This study adopts a mixed-method approach and the qualitative and quantitative data are 
integrated iteratively at the interpretive level. The qualitative analysis informs the 
organization of the key variables used in the quantitative analysis and is also used to 
elaborate more fully the survey results.   
 
The survey questionnaire contained questions on various aspects of scientists’ industrial 
links activities, their motivations and attitudes. The main variables used in the 
quantitative analysis are derived from the questions concerning: a) the nature of their 
involvement in different types of industrial links; b) their value orientations towards 
academia-industry interface; and c) the factors motivating them to engage with industry.  
 
4.2.1. Modes of engagement with industry: collaborative and commercial 
The scientists were asked to indicate if they had been involved in any industrial links 
activities over the last 10 years (multiple answers). Nearly three-quarters (73%) reported 
that they had involvement in industrial links of one kind or another, of which 39 percent 
were engaged in collaborative activities only and 34 percent also participated in 
commercialization. Among those engaged in commercialization: 30 % held patents, 10 % 
had been involved in licensing, 17% reported affiliation with start-ups and 14% had 
founded their own companies. It is important to note that collaborative and commercial 
modes of engagement are not discrete activities as the majority of scientists interface with 
industry through multiple channels. More notably, the majority of those engaged in 
commercial activities also had extensive involvement in various collaborative links. 
However, involvement in commercialization often brings controversies as it is seen as the 
incorporation of a ‘profit motive’ in academic science. Thus, a distinction is made 
between two different modes of engagement in the quantitative analysis: the 
‘collaborative’ category refers to those engaged in collaborative activities only, and the 
‘commercial’ category includes those involved in commercial activities.2    
 
4.2.2. Value orientations and attitudes towards commercial engagement  
The interviews found a great deal of variation in the scientists’ attitudes and beliefs about 
academia-industry collaboration and their perceived legitimacy of commercialization.   
Their value preferences and dispositions with regard to commercial engagement revealed 
four ‘orientational categories’.3 The categorisation places the scientists on a continuum 
defined by two polar sets of values: the ‘traditional’ versus the ‘entrepreneurial’.  
 
These four categories were initially derived inductively from the interviews and later 
cross checked against the survey data.  In the interviews, the scientists were asked 
detailed questions about their views on the interface between science and business, and 
how they interpret and evaluate their own positions and industrial links activities. At the 
end of the interviews, they were shown a card with four statements describing different 
beliefs and value preferences and rationales behind academia and industry collaboration 
(see, Appendix Table A1). The scientists were asked to select one statement that best 
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described their own orientations.  Although not all the scientists saw themselves as falling 
into ‘pure’ categories, their dominant orientations could be identified from their 
responses to the descriptive statements and other questions asked in the interviews. In the 
data analysis, the scientists’ ‘self-definitions’ were cross checked  against their responses 
to other relevant questions and generally found to be consistent. The classification was 
subsequently refined and used in the survey where the respondents were asked to select 
their ‘first best’ and ‘second best’ choice of statements that described their orientations. 
The distribution of the responses shows that in the great majority of cases, the second 
choice was contiguous to the first which illustrates the consistency of the choices. The 
first choice category is adopted for the quantitative analysis (Appendix Table A1). The 
distribution of the interview and survey samples by the four orientational categories is 
shown in Table 2. It should be noted that 22 of the 36 interviewees also responded to the 
survey which enables cross-checking of the consistency in the classification.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In this classification, there are two categories of traditional-oriented scientists, referred to 
as Type I ‘pure traditionalists’ and Type II ‘pragmatic traditionalists’.  Both are 
characterised by a belief that academia-industry should remain distinct but differ in their 
inclination to engage in commercial activities.  Type I pure traditionalists defy the 
growing pressures for commercialization and contest its legitimacy. They may develop 
some collaborative links with industry but typically have no intention to pursue 
commercial activities and can be said to be amotivated.  Type II pragmatic traditionalists 
adopt a more accommodating attitude and recognise a need to meet the growing 
institutional expectations for commercial engagement. They are prepared to experiment 
with commercial practices in anticipation of possible benefits. However, commercial 
engagement does not sit uncomfortably with their values and tends to cause much inner 
conflict. A Type II bioscientist, for example, mocked his own activities in seeking 
company funding by repeatedly saying that he was ‘selling his soul…’. These scientists 
do not identify with the values of commercialization and their participation in 
commercial activities reflects introjection.  
 
At the opposite pole are the Type IV ‘entrepreneurial scientists’ who see the boundary 
between academia and industry as entirely permeable, and they believe in the 
fundamental importance of science-business collaboration for knowledge application and 
commercial exploitation. To them, science is inherently commercial and the pursuit of 
commercial science is entirely logical and compatible with their academic role. For 
example, one professor described ‘entrepreneurial engagement’ as part of ‘the repertoire, 
base skills’ that he should retain as a professional scientist. Another saw the parallel 
activities in the academic and commercial arenas as an integral part of his professional 
role: ‘…it’s part of my life, you know, it’s not dislocated particularly’.  These 
entrepreneurial scientists appear to have fully accepted the norm of entrepreneurialism 
which can be taken to represent integration on the self-determination continuum. 
 
Between the ‘traditional’ and ‘entrepreneurial’, there is a mixed category of scientists, 
referred to as Type III ‘hybrids’. These scientists share the entrepreneurial scientists’ 
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belief in the importance and benefits of science-business collaboration, while maintaining 
the traditionalists’ commitment to the core scientific values. However, unlike the 
traditionalists, the hybrids did not appear to experience psychological discomfort when 
they embarked on commercial ventures.  They perceived such endeavours as largely 
legitimate and desirable for their scientific pursuits. Forming a spin-off company, for 
example, was seen as a way of maintaining their scientific autonomy and asserting 
control over the knowledge exploitation process so as to exclude unwanted commercial 
interests from big companies. They seek identification with commercial activity by 
reconstituting its meaning so that it becomes more congruent with their professional goals 
and values.  
 
Previous research suggests that scientists’ personal values and their beliefs about the 
benefits of commercialization influence their entrepreneurial behaviour (Renault, 2006; 
Krabel and Mueller, 2009). Table 3 shows that there is a strong association between the 
value orientations of scientists and their engagement in different types of industrial links. 
As expected, very few Type I pure traditionalists have commercial engagement whereas 
those displaying a Type IV ‘entrepreneurial’ orientation are more likely to be involved in 
commercial activities.  However, beyond this broad overall pattern, two observations are 
notable. The first is that the Type III ‘hybrid’ category constitutes the largest category 
(47%) among those engaged in commercial activities. The second point is that a 
significant proportion (30%) of those engaged in commercial activities display a Type II 
‘pragmatic traditional’ orientation. Even in the case of the company affiliates/ founders, 
who are most emblematic of the penetration of ‘academic capitalism’ into academia, 
about one-third see themselves as traditionalists and only one-fifth identify themselves as 
‘entrepreneurial’ scientists.  Half of the company affiliates/founders fall in the ‘hybrid’ 
category. 
 
These observations suggest that scientists’ engagement in commercial activities may be 
driven by diverse and mixed motives.  Given the very small number of Type I scientists 
involved in commercial activities, these are merged with Type II to form a single 
category of ‘traditional’ scientists in subsequent analysis. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
4.2.3. The motivating factors: ‘gold’, ‘ribbon’ and ‘puzzle’   
In the survey, respondents who had been engaged in industrial links were asked to score 
the relevance/importance of eight factors that had motivated them to pursue the 
activities.4 Each factor is ranked on a four-point scale: (1) ‘not relevant’, (2) ‘slightly 
relevant’, (3) ‘important’ and (4) ‘very important’.  Table 4 presents the descriptive 
results, showing the breakdown by the modes of industrial engagement and among those 
engaged in commercial activities, by their value orientations. Three points are worthy of 
note. First, funding/research resources appear at the top of the motivational hierarchy 
whereas personal income is at the bottom. Second, those engaged in commercial 
activities attached greater importance to nearly all the items, notably the knowledge-
related factors, compared with those involved in collaborative activities. Personal income 
is low in the motivational hierarchy for both categories but a significantly higher 
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proportion of those engaged in commercialization scored this as an ‘important/very 
important’ factor. And third, there is significant variation in the relative importance 
attached to the different items across the three categories of scientists engaged in 
commercial activities. While the Type II ‘traditional’ scientists were driven primarily by 
the funding/resource factor, the Type III and IV scientists attached high importance also 
to a broad array of knowledge, networking and reputational factors. It is also notable that 
‘intellectual curiosity’ was seen as an important factor by a significant proportion of the 
two latter categories. The Type IV scientists were most likely to acknowledge the 
importance of personal income, with 59 percent agreeing that this was an important/very 
important motivating factor.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
A correlation matrix was computed on the eight motivating factors which showed high 
correlations between the responses to some of the questions. To determine the common 
dimensions underlying them and for the purpose of data simplification, a factor analysis 
(principal component analysis – PCA) was performed on the eight items used in the 
questionnaire. Five factors which best represent the principal motivations as emerged 
from the interviews were extracted. The descriptive statistics and the PCA results are 
shown in Table 5. The first factor, labelled Reputation, groups the three items relating to 
external reputation building and networking and is categorised as a Ribbon motivator. 
Scientists are motivated to achieve prestige and recognition not only among their 
academic peers but also increasingly seek to do so through broadening their extra-
academic network ties.  Some of the scientists interviewed also pointed out that building 
links with firms helped to provide job opportunities for post-doctoral researchers and 
graduate students which could  enhance their reputation, resulting in a ‘virtuous circle’ of 
attracting promising young researchers into their laboratories. 
 
The second and third factors, referred to as Knowledge and Curiosity respectively, 
include the items pertaining to the intrinsic satisfaction derived from engaging in 
knowledge application/transfer and the fulfilment of intellectual curiosity. These are 
classified as puzzle-related, intrinsic motivators, comprising the social as well as personal 
dimensions (Lindenberg, 2001). While ‘satisfaction of intellectual curiosity’ is clearly a 
personal, intrinsic motivation, it may not be immediately apparent that ‘knowledge 
application/ exchange’ is also related to intrinsic motivation. Some scientists may adopt 
an instrumental stance and seek to exploit knowledge for pecuniary gain. However, this 
does not preclude the salience of non-pecuniary motivations. In fact, many of the 
scientists interviewed, notably the Type III hybrids, regard knowledge application as an 
extension of their scientific role in pushing the boundaries of science. Some saw 
commercialization as a means of realising the wider social impact of their research. This 
is similar to what some refer to as ‘public service’ or ‘prosocial’ motivation, an intrinsic 
work attribute shared by many professional groups (Andersen and Pallesen, 2008). 
According to Lindenberg (2001, p.335), this type of obligation-based motivation is a type 
of intrinsic motivation as the individuals ‘act on the basis of a principle and they do not 
pursue an external reward’.  
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The fourth and fifth factors appear as separate items on their own. Factor 4 Income 
illustrates the ‘for-profit’ motive, the Gold. The interviews suggest that many scientists 
develop links with firms for funding and other resources to support their research. Thus, 
factor 5 Funding/ Research Resources is closely related to the expectation of scientific 
recognition and rewards associated with the Ribbon.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
5. MOTIVATING FACTORS AND COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENT: 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 
Having identified the main motivating factors, a binary logistic regression was conducted 
to examine the relative importance of the five motivating factors for scientists’ 
engagement in commercial activities. The latter was taken as the dependent variable, with 
commercial engagement coded as one and, otherwise (collaborative engagement only) 
coded as zero. Several control variables likely to influence the propensity of scientists to 
engage in commercialization were included in the regression. First, scientists engaged in 
basic research may be less inclined to commercialise their research relative to those 
involved in applied research. So a dummy variable was included for engagement in basic 
research. Second, it has been widely acknowledged that the scientific discipline 
constitutes an important work context that influences scientists’ work orientations and 
entrepreneurial behaviours (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998; D'Este and Patel, 
2007). The norms, history of industrial engagement and market opportunities for 
knowledge exploitation diverge between different fields of research. Thus, dummy 
variables were included to control for variation across the following disciplines: 
biosciences, medicine, computer science/engineering, chemistry and physical sciences 
(the reference category).5 
 
In addition, three variables reflecting the experience of the individuals were included in 
the estimation. Younger academics may be more open to commercialization because they 
are less embedded in the academically-focused career tracks and may have already been 
socialised into the emerging entrepreneurial paradigm (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001a; 
Ambos et al., 2008). Thus, an age dummy was included in the regression with those age 
40 or under coded as one and otherwise zero. Prior work experience can influence 
scientists’ orientations towards commercial engagement and those who move from 
industry to pursue an academic career may display a stronger entrepreneurial orientation 
(Lam, 2007; Krabel and Mueller, 2009). A dummy variable for prior industrial 
experience was included in the regression: those who had previously worked in private 
industry were coded one and otherwise zero. Finally, academic life cycle theory suggests 
that scientists invest in the development of their human capital and reputation early in 
their careers and seek to obtain financial returns by engaging in entrepreneurial activities 
when their career goals have been achieved (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Audretsch and 
Stephan, 1999). Thus one might expect established academics to have a greater 
propensity to engage in commercial activities. An additional control variable on career 
stage, whether the scientist is a professor, was also included. Descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix of the variables are shown in Appendix Table A2.  
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Table 6 provides the results of the first regression. Model 1 shows the relationship 
between the motivating factors and commercial engagement as the dependent variable, 
and Model 2 includes the control variables. The factors that are positively and 
significantly associated with commercialization, in order of the strength of the 
coefficients, are: personal income (0.571), knowledge (0.514) and funding/research 
resources (0.266).  The ‘reputation/networking’ factor is negatively associated with 
commercial engagement (-0.328). The coefficient for the ‘curiosity’ factor is not 
statistically significant. These results suggest that relative to those involved in 
collaborative activities only, scientists engaged in commercialization are more strongly 
motivated by the ‘for-profit’ motive of the ‘gold’, as well the desire for knowledge 
application/transfer (the ‘puzzle’). Obtaining funding for research (the ‘ribbon’) is also 
important but differentiates the two groups to a lesser degree. Those engaged in 
collaborative activities only, on the other hand, attach far greater importance to reputation 
building and networking (the ‘ribbon’). This is not surprising given that collaboration is 
primarily a relationship-based, ‘open science’ channel of industrial engagement. These 
results support the argument that scientists’ have multiple motives for commercialising 
their research and the ‘gold’ is one amongst other non-pecuniary motivational drivers 
behind their commercial pursuits. 
 
With regard to the control variables, research disciplines and age have a significant 
influence on the likelihood of commercialization. As expected, those in medicine, 
biosciences, computer science/engineering and chemistry are more likely to engage in 
commercialization than those in the reference category of physical sciences. Younger 
scientists (age <40) are less likely to participate in commercialization. While these  
scientists may adopt a more open attitude towards commercialization as argued by some 
(Ambos et al., 2008), they are relatively less experienced and may have less expertise to 
‘sell’ than the older, more established scientists. The other three control variables, basic 
research, professor and previous industrial experience are not significantly associated 
with commercial engagement, suggesting that scientists with these characteristics are just 
as likely to be involved in collaborative as in commercial activities. This may seem 
counter-intuitive but one possible explanation is that those experienced scientists with an 
established track record of industrial links are just as likely to be involved in 
collaborative as in commercial activities. The control variables do not alter the significant 
relationship between the motivators and commercial engagement.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
6. DIVERSE VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND MULTIPLE MOTIVES 
This section uses compare means analysis and the interview data to examine if there are 
significant differences in the motives for engaging in commercial activities across the 
three categories of scientists.  
 
Table 7 compares the mean scores of the five motivating factors across the three 
categories of scientists and the T-test results of pair-wise comparisons. The results of 
ANOVA show significant variation in the relative importance of the different motivating 
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factors across the three categories. With regard to the ‘knowledge’, ‘income’ and 
‘funding’ factors, the variation is significant at 0.001 level and for the ‘curiosity’ factor, 
at 0.05 level. There is no significant difference with regard to the ‘reputation’ factor 
which is generally a less important motivator for those engaged in commercial activities 
relative to those involved in collaborative links (see Table 6).  
 
Turning to the results of the two sample comparisons, firstly, between the two polar 
categories of the ‘traditional’ and ‘entrepreneurial’, the T-test shows that the ‘funding 
factor’ (ribbon-related) is significantly more important for the former while ‘personal 
income’ (the gold), for the latter (both significant at the 0.001 level). The ‘knowledge’ 
factor (puzzle-related) is marginally more important for the ‘entrepreneurial’ than the 
‘traditional’ scientists (at the 0.1 level). Secondly, the comparison between the ‘hybrid’ 
and ‘traditional’ categories shows that the two puzzled-related factors, ‘knowledge’ (at 
the 0.001 level) and ‘curiosity’ (at the 0.01 level) are significantly more important for the 
former, suggesting that the hybrids are driven by a stronger desire for knowledge 
application/transfer and an intrinsic, personal curiosity in their pursuit of commercial 
activities. Finally, comparing the ‘hybrid’ with the ‘entrepreneurial’ category also shows 
that they differ significantly (at the 0.001 level) with regard to the ‘funding’ and ‘income’ 
factors. The hybrids, like the traditionalists are significantly more motivated by ‘funding’ 
and less motivated by ‘income’.  These comparisons indicate that one key factor that 
distinguishes the ‘entrepreneurial’ scientists from the other two categories is the 
importance of personal income. It should be noted that there are no significant differences 
between the ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘hybrid’ categories with regard to the ‘knowledge’ and 
‘curiosity’ factors, suggesting that these are common intrinsic motivators for both 
categories. 
 
Simplifying somewhat and using the extrinsic-intrinsic constructs, one might distinguish 
the motivational orientations of the three categories as follows:  a) the ‘traditional’ 
scientists are predominately extrinsically motivated, using commercial engagement as a 
means to obtain funding resources to support their quest for the ribbon; b) the ‘hybrids’ 
appear to be most intrinsically motivated by the puzzle (knowledge application and 
curiosity) as well as by the extrinsic rewards of the ribbon; and c) the ‘entrepreneurial’ 
scientists appear to be most strongly motivated by the gold and also, to some extent, by 
the intrinsic satisfaction of the puzzle. These results support the main thrust of the SDT 
argument about the relationship between value orientations and motivations. However, 
there is one apparent anomaly: the entrepreneurial scientists do not seem to be more 
intrinsically motivated then the hybrid category despite their stronger identification with 
commercial activities. Given that intrinsic motivation has social and affective 
dimensions, the survey results may not have fully captured both aspects. The in-depth 
interviews will shed light on this and provide a more fine-grained account of the general 
picture emerging from the statistical analysis. 
 
6.1. The Traditional Scientists as ‘Reluctant’ Commercializers: the ‘Ribbon’ 
 
The traditional scientists are ‘reluctant’ commercializers who pursue commercial 
activities mainly to obtain the much needed funding for research in an increasingly 
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resource constrained environment. The reply of a Type II professor to the question of 
what drove his group to form a spin-off company is illustrative: ‘We just wanted to test 
our ideas. We were desperate to get funding…Well – so none of us are born again 
entrepreneurs.  We were driven by the idea we wanted to do this research and to use 
it…’.  Besides funding, there is also evidence suggesting that some traditional scientists 
are motivated by the possibility of using commercial engagement as a currency for 
building scientific credit and enhancing their academic careers. Some recognised that 
commercial engagement had gained increased institutional legitimacy and it was 
something that might bring academic credentials. One Type II scientist involved in a 
start-up company and who had just been awarded his professorship at the time of the 
interview, pointed out that commercial engagement was ‘a risk worth taking’ because ‘it 
was the culture of the department’ and that ‘if you were going to be a top academic, 
that’s one of the things that you had to cover …’.  
 
To the traditional scientists, commercial engagement represents an introjected and 
extrinsically motivated behaviour. Introjection, according to social psychologists 
(Koestner et al., 1996), is associated with emotional incongruence and ambiguity and is a 
relatively unstable form of regulation. Evidence based on the interviews suggests that the 
position of the traditionalists was somewhat indeterminate and they would change 
directions based on evaluations of the success or failures of their trial efforts. Several of 
the traditional scientists interviewed, for example, talked about how their own attitudes 
and the ‘culture’ of their Departments had shifted from away from the entrepreneurial 
pull towards more a basic research orientation as a result of the unsuccessful ventures. 
Some expressed regret at their commercial involvement. One survey respondent, for 
example, wrote on the questionnaire:  ‘In retrospect, the time I spent on commercial links 
with industry distracted my concentration on research objectives, and my career might 
have had more fundamental impact if I had pursued those research objectives single-
mindedly’ (Type II Professor, biosciences).  These accounts suggest that scientists’ 
transition to academic entrepreneurialism is not necessarily a linear process but can be 
halted or even reversed when commercial engagement proved to be of limited value for 
furthering their quest for the ribbon.  
 
6.2. The Hybrid Scientists as ‘Strategic’ Commercializers: the ‘Ribbon’ and ‘Puzzle’ 
 
Unlike the traditionalists, the hybrids participate in commercial activities more 
autonomously, supported by feelings of identification. Besides funding, the hybrid 
scientists are also strongly intrinsically motivated in their commercial pursuits. The 
majority interviewed believed in the positive benefits of knowledge application (e.g. 
testing new ideas) and saw commercialization as an extension of their knowledge search 
activities. The following  quote is indicative: ‘ …I like to think our jobs are a mixture of 
that degree of freedom to operate and to push the boundaries, that may well lead… that 
boundary may well lead to some commercial thing or a licensing or a spin out…’.  To 
these scientists, commercialization represents an additional avenue for realising the wider 
potential of their particular science. Many interviewees talked about ‘the challenge’ of 
solving complex industrial problems and ‘the rewards that come with it can be 
intellectual, academic as well as financial’, to put it in the words of one Type III 
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professor.  To these scientists, knowledge application through taking part in commercial 
ventures represents a kind of puzzle-solving activity that satisfies their ‘intellectual 
curiosity’. The assumption that scientists derive the pleasure of puzzle-solving only from 
basic research is based on a narrow conception of the full range of creative scientific 
activity in their work. 
 
The hybrid scientists’ personal interest in knowledge application also appears to bolster a 
strong professional conviction to make their knowledge socially relevant. This is 
particularly notable among those researching in the life-sciences. The following reply of 
a company founder to the question of why forming the spin-offs is indicative: ‘...I think 
we as academics have a responsibility, especially in University X, to the nation really, 
we’re in a very privileged position. And our money comes from the State or from 
charities…’ (Type III professor, biosciences).  Another biomedical professor made a 
similar comment: ‘…we wanted to see if, you know, there was a potential new drug there 
for, you know, treating people who can’t get treated with anything else…’ Grant (2008) 
argues that personal interest in an activity can reinforce pro-social intrinsic motivation 
which is a particular form of intrinsic motivation based on a desire to help others 
resulting from identified regulation.  
 
The hybrid scientists can be described as ‘strategic’ commercializers in that they 
incorporate commercial practices into their repertoire of behaviour without sacrificing 
their focal academic identity. They will attempt to influence or manipulate the 
expectations of their industrial partners in order to shape the relationships.  As one Type 
III professor put it: ‘we have very clear ideas of what we want to do and we’ll play the 
company’s [game]… you know, we’re not going to be pushed around’. They seek to 
resolve the cognitive dissonance resulting from the conflicting logics of science and 
commerce by actively reconstituting the meanings of commercialization better to fit with 
their self-endorsed values and professional goals.  This amounts to what El-Sawad et al 
(2004) refer to as a ‘double think’ strategy for alleviating any psychological discomfort 
generated from holding contradictory norms.   
 
6.3. The Entrepreneurial Scientists as ‘Committed’ Commercializers: the ‘Gold’ 
and ‘Puzzle’ 
 
The survey results show that the type IV entrepreneurial scientists set themselves apart 
from the other two categories by the apparent importance of the ‘gold’ as a motivating 
factor. In the interviews, these scientists also openly acknowledged the relevance of 
financial rewards. The following remark made by a company founder is illustrative: 
‘…you’ve got to make money, the company is to make money, right, it’s not like another 
item on your frigging CV, it’s to make money! That’s why you do it! It’s not a CV driven 
thing, it’s not like a publication…’ (Type IV professor, computer science).  It would 
appear that these scientists have been captured by the ‘for-profit’ motive. However, 
probing deeper into their seemingly ‘self-interested’ economic narratives suggests a more 
nuanced and ambivalent picture. In the interviews, these scientists sought to reframe what 
money meant for them to legitimate their engagement in ‘profit making’ activities. Some 
talked about the money reward in a somewhat negative manner in that it was portrayed as 
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a source of discontent, what Herzberg (1966) refers to as a ‘hygiene’ factor, rather than a 
positive motivator. Complaints about being underpaid and lagging academic salaries 
permeated the conversations in the interviews when the scientists responded to the 
question about the money incentive.  The same company founder quoted above said, ‘… 
the university pays absolute peanuts and therefore you’d be totally mad not to do it if you 
are in an area where you can do it’.  
 
Academic scientists, like everyone else, need to earn a decent living. Some may well be 
‘cashing in’ on their scientific expertise. Given that money is not supposed to be the 
‘ideal typical motivation’ in academia, the relevance of the gold could have been under-
reported in the survey. The evidence from the interviews suggests that this ‘social 
desirability bias’ (Moorman and Podsakoff, 1992) may have affected the responses of 
those scientists who identify more closely with the traditional academic norms than the 
Type IV scientists. For example, the Type II and III scientists were less at ease in talking 
about the money incentive in the interviews. Some tried to downplay its personal 
importance by using humour or laughter during the conversation, saying that the extra 
income could help to ‘pay children’s school fees’ or ‘to cover the mortgage’. Several 
tried to distance themselves by placing the ‘blame’ on their wives. For example, one 
company founder said that money was ‘less important’ for himself, ‘but if you ask my 
wife, she might give you a different answer!’ (Type III professor, physics).  Humour, 
according to Coser (1966), is a form of role distance which can be used to allay feelings 
of discomfort.  
 
However, what is clear from the evidence presented is that even for the apparently most 
market-oriented Type IV scientists, the gold appears to be only one of the motivational 
drivers underlying their commercial endeavours.  Though not captured in the survey 
results, the interviews reveal the salience of an enjoyment-based (hedonic) intrinsic 
motivation (Lindenberg, 2001) among the entrepreneurial scientists.  For example, many  
used words such as ‘excitement’, ‘fun’ and ‘thrill’ to describe the psychic satisfaction 
derived from taking part in commercial ventures. To some, the sense of achievement that 
they experienced in starting up a business venture was no less intense than the 
satisfaction of solving a scientific puzzle.  The following interview quote vividly 
expresses this affective psychological state experienced by a company founder:  
‘….Curiosity, fantasy and excitement…The major reward for me is the excitement. The 
excitement of doing it, number one; number two, the intellectual satisfaction of seeing 
your ideas going all the way through to make medicines that will change human 
suffering. So emotional, and then taking part in an organisation, it’s a fantastic 
organisation!’ (Professor, biomedicine). Another Type IV professor stated that it was 
‘ambition’ and his ‘overwhelming ego’ that drove his commercial ventures.  
 
The Type IV entrepreneurial scientists are ‘committed’ commercializers who appear to 
be driven by what Shane et al (2003) refer to as an ‘egoistic passion’ for achievement. 
This manifests in their love for the activity as well as the fortune that may come along 
with it. They have autonomous reasons for pursuing the puzzle as well as the gold, and 
external regulation may have limited effect on their behaviour.   
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7. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The assumption that scientists are motivated by the ribbon and puzzle in academic 
research while commercial engagement is driven primarily by the pursuit of the gold 
builds on a false dichotomy and polarised view of human motivation. Drawing on 
theories of motivation in social psychology, this study offers important insights into the 
diverse motives driving the commercial behaviours of scientists. In common with several 
other studies (e.g. Baldini et al., 2007; Göktepe-Hulten and Mahagaonkar, 2010), it finds 
that the great majority of the scientists are motivated by the traditional rewards of the 
ribbon in their commercial pursuits and the gold is seen as important only by a small 
minority. Beyond the ribbon and gold, this study highlights the role of intrinsic 
motivation, as in puzzle-solving, in driving the commercial endeavours of many of the 
scientists studied.  Intrinsic motivation has long been recognised by social psychologists 
as a pervasive and powerful driver of human action but is neglected in much of the 
existing research on scientists’ transition to academic entrepreneurialism. This study 
suggests that a fuller explanation of scientists’ commercial behaviour will need to 
consider a broader mix of motives beyond the narrow confines of extrinsic rewards to 
include the social and affective aspects related to intrinsic motivation. Scientists, like 
other professionals, have the desire to expend effort to benefit others and society in the 
context of both academic and entrepreneurial science. This ‘pro-social’ motivation is a 
specific form of intrinsic motivation (Grant, 2008). Moreover, having fun or the joy of 
achievement is at the heart of Lindenberg’s (2001) idea of ‘enjoyment-based’ intrinsic 
motivation.  The idea that fun of play is an important motivation underpinning creative 
and inventive behaviour is a longstanding one (Rossman, 1931; Loewenstein, 1994). 
Gustin (1973) argues that creative scientists are motivated to do charismatic things and 
that science is charismatic because of its puzzle-solving nature. One might argue that for 
some scientists, commercial engagement represents a kind of puzzle that satisfies their 
desire for pursuing ‘charismatic’ activities.  
 
This study has also provided a close analysis of how scientists’ value preferences 
influence their motives for commercial engagement and the relative importance of the 
‘gold’, ‘ribbon’ or ‘puzzle’ as desired outcomes. The identification of three distinct 
orientational categories among the scientists engaged in commercial activities suggests 
that there is no one single type of entrepreneurial scientists driven by a common motive. 
Although previous research suggests that scientists involved in commercialization are 
heterogeneous (Shinn and Lamy, 2006; Markman et al., 2008), this study attempts to 
provide a first theoretical explanation. It shows how motives for behaviour vary in 
accordance with the level of congruence between individuals’ values and those associated 
with the activity concerned.  The analysis draws attention to ‘internalisation’ of values 
and external regulation as a key factor differentiating the types of motives driving the 
commercial behaviour of scientists. Values are not fixed but may evolve over time which 
could result in changes in motives and behaviours.  Although the data presented in this 
paper relate to a single point in time and therefore do not provide direct evidence of 
change, the differently positioned scientists on the self-determination continuum 
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illustrates the possibility of orientational shifts.  SDT argues that human beings have an 
organismic tendency towards autonomy and self-regulation in their behaviour. However, 
this by no means suggests that an introjected behaviour will gradually become identified 
or integrated over time. Evidence from the interviews shows the indeterminacy of the 
‘traditionalists’. The preponderance of the ‘hybrid’ category illustrates that normative 
change, more often than not, involves the paradoxical combination of opposing values in 
an ambivalent manner. The salience of enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation among the 
‘entrepreneurial’ scientists illustrates the primacy of self-motivation rather than external 
regulation in driving their commercial behaviour.  
 
The findings of this study also offer some practical implications. Policies designed to 
promote research commercialization often assume that academics respond to financial 
incentives tied to successful exploitation of their ideas. However, if academics are 
motivated by a complex mix of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, then policy initiatives 
focussing narrowly on providing financial rewards might be inadequate or even 
misplaced. Moreover, given the diverse values and motives underlying scientists’ 
commercial pursuits, it is unlikely that an undifferentiated approach will be effective in 
eliciting the requisite effort across the board. Some authors (Hoye and Pries, 2009; 
Krabel and Mueller, 2009) propose that policies to facilitate academic entrepreneurialism 
should target the subpopulation of academic researchers with commercialization-friendly 
attitudes such as the ‘habitual entrepreneurs’.  This study suggests that external regulation 
may have limited effect on those who are already deeply engaged in the activity as in the 
case of the Type IV entrepreneurial scientists. These scientists have autonomous reasons 
for pursuing commercial science and they may follow what they find to be professionally 
challenging and personally interesting rather than anything else. On the contrary, this 
study suggests that it is the Type II traditionalists who may be most amenable to 
behavioural change in response to external rewards linked to the ribbon. In particular, 
rewards in the form of additional funding for research and ascription of academic status 
to commercial success may have high motivating power for inducing some traditionalists 
to go down the commercial path. These ribbon-related rewards may also reinforce the 
commercial behaviour of the Type III hybrids and strengthen their perception of the 
positive benefits of the activity.  There is, however, always a potential danger that top-
down engineering of entrepreneurialism may undermine scientists’ sense of self-
determination and the intrinsic, puzzle-solving aspect of their motivation which is the 
ultimate driver of creativity. While intrinsic motivation cannot be enforced, it can be 
enabled through socialisation and competence enhancing provisions to strengthen 
feelings of autonomy and the culture of creativity and pro-social motivation (Osterloh, 
2006). 
 
Before closing, a number of limitations of the study should be noted. First, the items used 
to assess motivation were derived initially from the individual interviews and built on the 
conceptual literature on different aspects of motivation. Although the consistency 
between the interview and survey findings demonstrates reliability of the measures 
adopted, more use could have been made of the motivational scales developed by social 
psychologists to incorporate the enjoyment aspect of intrinsic motivation6. Second, the 
study has examined the relationship between the motivating factors and commercial 
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engagement in terms of whether the scientists had been involved in any commercial 
activities. This addresses the issue of behavioural choice but does not offer insight into 
the motivational implications for behavioural intensity or persistence. The interview data 
offer tentative evidence about the variation in motivational strength across the three 
different categories of scientists and the likelihood of behavioural maintenance. Future 
research might include additional measures such as the amount of time spent on the 
activity and duration of engagement to capture behavioural intensity and persistence. 
Thirdly, the cross-sectional nature of the data precludes an analysis of change in motives 
over time. The question of how scientists might shift from one type to another over the 
course of their careers and possible causes merit further research.  Finally, the nature of 
the sample also calls for some qualification. The study has looked at the experience of a 
small sample of ‘elite scientists’ in major research universities who have relatively strong 
bargaining power and varied resource options. Great care would be needed before 
extending these findings to scientists working in a more constraining environment such as 
Britain’s ‘new universities’.  
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Table 1 The interview and survey samples  
 
Discipline No of 
interviewees
No. of survey 
responses  
Biosciences/medicine* 
 
 
13 347         (21%)*** 
Computer 
science/engineering 
 
11 174         (26%) 
Physical sciences** 
 
 
12 213         (25%) 
Total 
 
36 734         (24% ) 
*It was not possible to clearly distinguish the survey population between these two disciplines as many 
academics in medicine or related departments were researching in the field of biological sciences. The 
breakdown of responses in terms of main research areas were:  biological sciences 218 and medicine 129. 
** These include chemistry (58), physics (89) and mathematical sciences (66). 
*** The slightly lower response rate could be due to the fact that the mailing lists obtained from the 
medical departments included certain number of clinical staff who should not have been included in the 
target population. 
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Table 2 Scientists’ orientations towards university-industry links 
 
Orientational categories Interview 
sample 
 
Survey 
sample  
 
Type I ‘Pure traditional’ 
-believes academia and industry should be 
distinct and pursue success strictly in 
academic arena 
 
3 
(8%) 
110    
(16%)    
Type II ‘Pragmatic traditional’  
-believes academia and industry should be 
distinct, but also recognises need to 
collaborate for pragmatic reasons  
 
8 
(22%) 
230 
(34%) 
Type III ‘Hybrid’ 
- believes in the fundamental importance of 
science-business collaboration for scientific 
advancement, but also recognises need to 
maintain boundary 
16 
(44%) 
266 
(39 %) 
Type IV ‘Entrepreneurial’  
-believes in the fundamental importance of 
science-business collaboration for 
knowledge application/exploitation 
 
 9 
(25%) 
70 
(11%) 
Total  (N) 36 
(100%) 
676 
(100%) 
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Table 3  Value orientations of scientists and industrial engagement  
 
 Type I 
Pure 
Traditional
Type II 
Pragmatic 
Traditional 
Type III 
Hybrid 
Type IV 
Entrepreneurial
Total  
(N) 
No links 
 
40% 30% 23% 7% 100.0% 
(156) 
 
Collaborative*  12 40 42 6 100.0 
(277) 
 
Commercial**  6 30 47 17 100.0 
(243) 
 
Of which: company 
affiliates/founders*** 
4 25 50 20 100.0 
(125) 
 
Total 
(N) 
 
16 
(110) 
34 
(230) 
39 
(266) 
11 
(70) 
100.0 
(676) 
X2=102.15; df=6; p<0.001 
*Those engaged in collaborative links only: collaborative research, contract research, consultancy, student 
sponsorship and joint publication. 
** Those engaged in both collaborative and commercial links including patenting/licensing, affiliation with 
start-ups and company formation.  
*** This is a subset of those with commercial links; excluded from X2 test. 
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Table 4 Proportion of respondents who reported the motivating factors as ‘important’ or ‘very important’ 
 
Q. Which of the following factors have motivated you personally to engage in industrial links activities? (Multiple answers)  
 
 All 
 
Collaborative Commercial  Type I+II** 
‘Traditional’  
Type III 
‘Hybrid’ 
Type IV 
‘Entrepreneurial 
To increase funding and other  
research resources 
83% 80% 86% 89% 
 
90% 
 
68% 
 
Application & exploitation of 
research results 
70 
 
57 84 73 
 
92 
 
86 
 
To create opportunities for 
Knowledge exchange/transfer 
66 
 
58 73 58 
 
84 
 
70 
 
To satisfy your intellectual 
curiosity 
59 57 62 52 69 60 
To build personal and professional 
networks 
59 
 
57 61 52 
 
68 
 
62 
 
To enhance the visibility of your 
research 
48 
 
43 52 42 
 
60 
 
50 
 
To provide work placement or job 
opportunities for students 
41 45 35 30 40 33 
To increase your personal income 27 17 38 34 
 
35 
 
59 
 
Number of observations (N)*  
 
(502) (266) (236) (83) (110) (42) 
*Only those with industrial links responded to this question. The total number of observations varies slightly across the different items due to missing or ‘don’t 
know’ responses. 
** Only 13 out of the 110 Type I scientists were involved in commercial activities and responded to this question; these were merged with the Type II to form a 
single ‘traditional’ category. 
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Table 5    Factor analysis* 
 
Motivating factors 
 
Mean St. 
Dev. 
Factor 1 
Reputation 
(Ribbon) 
Factor 2 
Knowledge 
(Puzzle) 
Factor 3 
Curiosity 
(Puzzle) 
Factor 4 
Income 
(Gold) 
Factor 5 
Funding 
(Ribbon) 
To increase funding and other  research resources 
 
3.25 .922 .164 .120 .005 .006 .972 
Application & exploitation of research results 
 
2.88 1.000 .066 .900 .003 .138 .129 
To create opportunities for Knowledge 
exchange/transfer 
2.78 .966 .232 .759 .317 -.055 .013 
To satisfy your intellectual curiosity 
 
2.66 1.044 .148 .173 .934 .042 -.011 
To build personal and professional networks 
 
2.67 .984 .731 .132 .294 .231 .155 
To enhance the visibility of your research** 
 
2.37 1.050 .451 .427 .356 .245 .202 
To provide work placement or job opportunities 
for students 
2.22 1.028 .900 .132 .003 -.046 .072 
To increase your personal income 
 
1.90 1.019 .095 .079 .048 .969 .003 
Rotation sums of squared loadings 
Proportion of variance explained (%) 
Cumulative proportion of variance explained (%) 
 
  1.66 
20.80 
20.80 
1.65 
20.69 
41.49 
1.19 
14.86 
56.35 
1.08 
13.49 
69.84 
1.03 
12.89 
82.73 
* Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation; 5 factors are retained in the extraction. 
** Although this factor loads almost equally onto factors 1 and 2, it is grouped under factor 1 ‘reputation’ for two reasons: a) it makes sense to treat ‘research 
visibility’ as a ribbon-related factor; and b) it loads strongly (0.618) on factor 1 when PCA is performed on the sub-sample of those engaged in commercial 
activities. 
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Table 6 Factors motivating commercial engagement 
 
Binary logistic regression: Dependent variable=commercial engagement (1,0) 
 
Variables Model 1  Model 2  
     
Funding (Ribbon) 0.248* (0.104) 0.266* (0.113) 
Reputation (Ribbon) -0.314** (0.101) -0.328** (0.110) 
Knowledge (Puzzle) 0.520*** (0.105) 0.514*** (0.114) 
Curiosity (Puzzle) 0.083 (0.101) 0.076 (0.107) 
Income(Gold) 0.545*** (0.103) 0.571*** (0.113) 
     
Controls      
Basic research   -0.069 (0.240) 
Biosciences    0.802* (0.355) 
Medicine   0.959* (0.387) 
Computer Sci/Engineering   0.707* (0.344) 
Chemistry   0.855* (0.418) 
Professor   0.365 (0.239) 
Age (<40)   -0.852*** (0.268) 
Previous industrial experience   0.318 (0.232) 
Constant -0.108 (0.100) -0.812* (0.348) 
     
Cox & Snell R Square 0.135  0.189  
Nagelkerke R square 0.180  0.253  
Model chi square 67.851  96.417  
Significance 0.000  0.000  
Classification correct 63.9%  69.7%  
N=468     
+p<0.1    *p<0.05    **p<0.01    ***p<0.001 
 Notes:  a) Robust standard errors in brackets 
b)The reference category for the disciplinary variables is Physical sciences   (physics and 
mathematics). 
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Table 7 T-tests for equality of means of factors motivating commercial engagement: traditional, hybrid and entrepreneurial 
 
 
Traditional 
 
(N=79) 
Hybrid 
 
(N=105) 
Entrepreneurial 
 
(N=38) 
Anova 
f-test 
Two sample t-tests Motivating 
factors/ 
Orientational 
categories 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
X 
 
Std 
Dev. 
Mean 
 
Y 
 
Std 
Dev. 
Mean 
 
Z 
 
Std 
Dev. 
Between 
3 groups 
Traditional 
vs. 
Entrepreneurial  
X≠Z 
Traditional 
vs. Hybrid 
 
X≠Y 
Hybrid vs. 
Entrepreneurial 
 
Y≠Z 
Funding  
 
0.29 0.86 0.16 0.85 -0.41 1.03 8.506 
*** 
3.898 
*** 
1.061 3.364 
*** 
Reputation 
 
-0.26 0.98 -0.39 0.99 -0.19 0.95 1.200 -0.343 -1.502 0.835 
Knowledge 
 
-0.05 0.94 0.43 0.73 0.26 0.99 7.140 
*** 
-1.638 
+ 
-3.916 
*** 
1.123 
Curiosity 
 
-0.18 0.95 0.17 0.89 0.09 0.99 3.224 
* 
-1.446 -2.530 
** 
0.413 
Income 
 
0.16 1.02 0.14 0.99 0.84 1.01 7.258 
*** 
-3.370 
*** 
0.084 -3.639 
*** 
+p<0.1    *p<0.05    **p<0.01    ***p<0.001 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  Scientists’ orientations towards academia-industry collaboration: 
Distribution of responses by first and second best choices 
 
Please indicate which of the following statements best describe your professional orientation 
(indicate your first best and second best choice if appropriate) 
                  
       First best        Second best 
                                                                       
1. I believe that academia and industry should be distinct and    (  )             (  ) 
I pursue success strictly in the academic arena 
 
2. I believe that academia and industry should be distinct but 
 I pursue industrial links activities mainly to acquire resources    (  )             (  ) 
 to support academic research 
 
3. I believe in the fundamental importance of academic-industry  (  )            (  ) 
 collaboration and I pursue industrial links activities 
 for scientific advancement  
 
4. I believe in the fundamental importance of academic-industry  (  )            (  ) 
 collaboration and I pursue industrial links activities 
 for application and commercial exploitation 
 
 
Orientational 
category 
Choice of 
statements 
Distribution 
by first 
choice 
No. (%) 
Distribution 
by second 
choice 
No.  (%) 
Type I 
‘Pure  
Traditional’ 
1 110 
(16%) 
87 
(13%) 
Type II 
‘Pragmatic 
Traditional’ 
2 230 
(34%) 
203 
(30%) 
Type III  
‘Hybrid’ 
 
3 266 
(39%) 
213 
(32%) 
Type IV 
‘Entrepreneurial’ 
  
4  70 
(11%) 
142 
(21%) 
 Multiple* 
answers 
 
 - 31 
(4%) 
Total 
 
 676  
(100%) 
676 
(100%) 
*No answer or multiple (unclassifiable) answers to first choice are excluded from the analysis: 58 cases  
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Table A2 Descriptive Statistics   
 
 Min. Max. Mean Std. 
dev 
Funding -2.591 1.407 0.012 1.00
Reputation -2.153 2.222 -0.002 1.00
Knowledge -2.797 1.871 0.007 1.00
Curiosity -2.361 1.991 -0.002 1.00
Income -1.569 2.636 0.007 1.00
Basic research 0 1 0.44 0.50
Biosciences 0 1 0.27 0.44
Medicine 0 1 0.18 0.39
Comp/Eng. 0 1 0.28 0.45
Chemistry  0.10 0.30
Physical Sci. (ref.) 0 1 0.17 0.37
Professor 0 1 0.39 0.49
Age1 (<40) 0 1 0.27 0.44
Previous experience 0 1 0.38 0.49
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Table A3 Correlations 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Funding 1              
2. Reputation 
 
.000 1             
3. Knowledge 
 
-.020 -.003 1            
4. Curiosity 
 
-.002 -.008 -.007 1           
5. Income 
 
-.002 -.001 -.003 .000 1          
6. Basic 
research 
-.111* -.049 -.181** -.071 -.138* 1         
7. Biosciences 
 
-.097* -.064 -.101* -.131** -.074 .351** 1        
8. Medicine 
 
.077 -.165** .009 .043 -.073 -.252** -.287** 1       
9. Computer 
sci/engineering 
.026 .167** .142** -.012 .202** -.185** -.378** -.298** 1      
10. Chemistry .134** .084 -.010 .075 -.081 -.023 -.203** -.160** -.211** 1     
11. Physical sci. 
(ref)   
-.115* -.031 -.057 .060 -.017 .085 -.269** -.212** -.279** -.150** 1    
12. Professor 
 
.000 -.023 -.010 .021 .014 .115** -.055 .001 .013 -.043 .084 1   
13. Age (< 40) 
 
.070 .097* -.036 -.035 .071 .010 -.065 -.066 .099* .052 -.016 -.401** 1  
14. Previous  
experience 
.007 .078 .121** .085 .209** -.145** -.159** -.220** .272** .021 .072 -.004 -.026 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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1  Thorough searches were conducted on the universities’ websites and the individual names, their 
departmental affiliations and e-mail addresses were obtained based on the information available. In the 
great majority of the cases, we were able to obtain the full lists of academic staff of the relevant disciplines. 
There were a very small number of exceptions in the case of bio-medical research where the staff names 
were withheld because of the sensitivity of the work.  In the case of research units, we included all the 
centre directors and principal investigators listed but excluded the post-doctoral researchers and graduate 
students the majority of whom were contract researchers. 
2 The ‘commercial’ category includes those engaged in both collaborative and commercial activities, as 
well as a small minority (1.9%; 14 respondents) engaged in commercial activities only.  
3 Following Mallon et al (2005), the term ‘orientational category’ is used here to refer to an aggregation of 
individual data which classify people according to their individual predispositions based on their beliefs, 
wants and plans. It reflects differences in value preferences and subjective interpretations of actions. 
4 In a survey of this kind, it is possible that individuals may exaggerate motives that they believe are 
socially desirable and give lower scores to items deemed less socially desirable. The data on motives 
should be interpreted bearing in mind the possibility of such a ‘social desirability bias’ (Moorman and 
Podsakoff 1992).  
5 Chemistry was initially included in the category of ‘physical sciences’ in the sample shown in Table I but 
treated as a separate discipline in the regression because the descriptive cross-tabulation results show some 
significant variations in the attitudes and industrial activities between the scientists in this field and those in 
physics and mathematics. 
6 For example, the Work Preference Inventory (Amabile et al 1994) and the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory 
 http://www.psych.rochester.edu/SDT/measures/word/IMIfull.doc  
